Foreign Policy Bulletin. 1 It was designed by Monty G. Marshall and Jack Goldstone at the Center for Global Policy, George Mason University, and patterned after the Peace and Conflict series created by Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr in 2001. These global report series were designed to satisfy the imperative for knowing the contrasting conditions characterizing the many states comprising the emerging global system and gauging general system performance in an era of dynamic globalization. The original report published in 2000 sparked controversy within the global policy community with its prescient observation, and presentation of supporting evidence, that "the extent of warfare among and within states lessened by nearly half in the first decade after the [end of the] Cold War." 2 This claim was initially dismissed as either mistaken or misinformed by most officials and analysts in the United Nations Secretariat when it was brought to their attention. The claim clearly challenged the prevailing perception of increasing global disorder and that the world was becoming a more, not less, dangerous place. 3 It took several years before critical reaction turned away from examining the claim itself to offering explanations for the global decrease in warfare. In the current Global Report, we continue the original claim by observing that global warfare has remained in decline through 2007 and has diminished by over sixty percent since its peak in the late 1980s. Consistent with the decline in major armed conflicts has been the continuing increase in the number and consolidation of democratic regimes, rising to ninety-four at the end of 2007 (nearly sixty percent of the 162 countries examined in this report). Some cause for concern must also be reported: the number of ongoing armed conflicts may be showing signs of leveling off, the frequency of onsets of new armed conflicts in the world has not decreased substantially since the end of the Cold War in 1991, and the occurrence of "high casualty terrorist bombings" has continued to increase through 2007. It appears that, while world politics have been successful in gaining peaceful settlements to many of the world's armed conflicts, several long-running wars continue to resist peaceful settlement and new armed conflicts continue to break out regularly.
This report begins with a brief discussion of general, systemic trends in global conflict, governance, and development, with a detailed assessment of changes in State Fragility since 1995. It then presents the State Fragility Index and Matrix 2008 (Table 1 ) which provides an array of measures of individual state fragilities and, by implication, a systematic assessment of the capacities and prospects for each of the 162 independent countries (with total populations greater than 500,000) that comprise the global system. The State Fragility Index combines scores measuring two essential qualities of state performance: effectiveness and legitimacy; these two quality indices combine scores on distinct measures of the key performance dimensions of security, governance, economics, and social development. The latest version of the Fragility Matrix has established a baseline set of values for its eight component indicators in order to measure State Fragility in previous years and examine changes in each indicator over time.
Global Trends and Systems Analysis
Conventional analyses of security and governance factors have for too long relied almost exclusively on individual or dyadic (bilateral) analysis, that is, on the conditions relevant to a particular country or state or relative to the interactions of two states. Systems analysis was largely confined to the analysis of alliance structures and treaty organizations. The Cold War was, at once, the penultimate example of dyadic analysis (the "superpower confrontation") and a symbolic end to the anarchic, Westphalian state system. It is a natural consequence of the end of the Cold War that we should begin an era of open globalization and, with that, widen our perspectives to recognize the complexities and densities of interactions, interconnections, and networks among the myriad actors that constitute the emerging "global system of states." 4 Systems analysis necessarily focuses on the complex relations between dynamics (human agency and environmental forces) and statics (physical and social attributes, conditions, and structures). Basic societalsystems analysis must take into account the interconnectedness of three key, or fundamental, dimensions: conflict, governance, and development (including both physical and social capital; Figure 1 ). 5 Available technology largely determines the size and complexity of viable societal-systems. The qualities, and prospects, of each of the three fundamental dimensions of societalsystems critically affects the qualities of the other two dimensions to such a degree that it is not possible to meaningfully analyze one dimension without taking the other two into account. Any change in one dimension will have consequences for each of the other dimensions; any limitation or weakness in one of the key dimensions will lessen the prospects for improvement in the other dimensions. Successful performance of a societal-system can be expected to be both incremental and congruent among the key dimensions. Societal-system performance, then, depends on the system's capabilities for collective action: applied coordination (effectiveness) and voluntary compliance (legitimacy). A performance evaluation of a societal-system, whether taken at the local, regional, or global level, must measure and track performance in all key dimensions with a mind toward coherence, progress, and congruence among the dimensions. Problems that arise in societalsystem dynamics can stem from any of the three fundamental dimensions. The qualities of governance and development must be taken into account when analyzing or leveraging conflict. Likewise, the qualities of conflict and governance must be included when examining the qualities of and potential for development and the qualities of conflict and development critically affect the nature and prospects of governance.
This report provides general, macro-comparative evaluations of contemporary qualities and trends over time in the three fundamental dimensions of societal-systems analysis at the global level. These performance evaluations are intended to help inform our audience of the immediate circumstances and prospects of globalization.
Global Governance
Democracy and autocracy are commonly viewed as contrasting and distinct forms of governance. Principal differences are found in the ways executive power is acquired and transferred, how political power is exercised and constrained, how social order is defined and maintained, and how much influence public interests and opinion have on the decision making process. Despite fundamental differences, these two ideal forms of governance are often perceived as comparably stable and effective in maintaining social order. In real terms, however, different countries have different mixes and qualities of governing authority; the ideal types are rarely observed in practice. Even though some countries may have mixed features of openness, competitiveness, and regulation, the core qualities of democracy and autocracy can be viewed as defining opposite ends of a governance scale. We have rated the levels of both democracy and autocracy for each country and year using coded information on the general qualities of political institutions and processes, including executive recruitment, constraints on executive action, and political competition. These ratings have been combined into a single, scaled measure of regime governance: the Polity score. The Polity scale ranges from -10, fully institutionalized autocracy, to +10, fully institutionalized democracy. 6 A perfect +10 democracy, like Australia, Greece, and Sweden, has institutionalized procedures for open and competitive political participation; chooses and replaces chief executives in open, competitive elections; and imposes substantial checks and balances on the powers of the chief executive. Countries with Polity scores from +6 to +10 are counted as democracies in tracking "Global Trends in Governance, 1946-2007" (Figure 2 ). Elected governments that fall short of a perfect +10, like Bolivia, Mozambique, Turkey, and Indonesia, may have weaker checks on executive power, some restrictions on political participation, or shortcomings in the application of the rule of law to opposition groups.
In a perfect -10 autocracy, by contrast, citizens' participation is sharply restricted or suppressed; chief executives are selected according to clearly defined (usually hereditary) rules of succession from within the established political elite; and, once in office, chief executives exercise power with few or no checks from legislative, judicial, or civil society institutions. Only Saudi Arabia and Qatar are rated as fully institutionalized autocracies in early 2008. Other monarchies, such as those in Bhutan, Morocco, and Swaziland, share some powers with elected officials. In general, except for a strong presence in the oil-producing states of the Arabian Peninsula, hereditary monarchy has nearly disappeared as a form of governance in the early 21 st century. Autocratic governance at the turn of the century is far more likely to be characterized by the authoritarian rule of personalistic leaders, military juntas, or one-party structures; Libya, Myanmar (Burma), and Vietnam are examples of these non-monarchical autocracies. Besides having slightly more open, or less-clearly defined, rules of succession, less-than-perfect autocracies may allow some space for political participation or impose some effective limits on executive authority; examples include Belarus, China, and Zimbabwe. Countries with Polity scores of -10 to -6 are counted as autocracies in Figure 2 .
Many governments have a mix of democratic and autocratic features, for example holding competitive elections for a legislature that exercises little effective control on
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the executive branch or allowing open political competition among some social groups while seriously restricting participation of other groups. There are many reasons why countries may come to be characterized by such inconsistencies, or incoherence, in governance. Some countries may be implementing a staged transition from autocracy to greater democracy; others may institute piecemeal reforms due to increasing demands from emerging political groups; others may simply be losing their capacity to maintain strict political controls and suppress dissent. Societal conflict and factionalism often stalemate democratic experiments: some regimes may be unable to fully institutionalize reforms due to serious disagreements among social groups or key political elites; some may harden their institutions in response to political crises or due to the personal ambitions of opportunistic leaders; and others may simply lose control of the political dynamics that enable, or disable, effective governance. Whereas democracy and autocracy are very different forms and strategies of governance, they are very similar in their general capacity to maintain central authority, control the policy agenda, and manage political dynamics. Anocracy, by contrast, is characterized by institutions and political elites that are far less capable of performing these fundamental tasks and ensuring their own continuity. Anocratic regimes very often reflect an inherent quality of instability or ineffectiveness and are especially vulnerable to the onset of new political instability events, such as outbreaks of armed conflict, unexpected changes in leadership, or adverse regime changes (e.g., a seizure of power by a personalistic or military leader).
Anocracies are a middling category rather than a distinct form of governance. They are countries whose governments are neither fully democratic nor fully autocratic;
their Polity scores range from -5 to +5. 7 Some such countries have succeeded in establishing democracy following a staged transition from autocracy through anocracy, as in Mexico, Nicaragua, Senegal, and Taiwan. A number of African and a few Middle Eastern countries have recently begun a cautious transition to greater openness, among them Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Ghana, Guinea, Jordan, and Tanzania.
Ivory Coast appeared to be headed on a similar course before stumbling (in 2002) into civil war and regime failure; Iran also reversed the course of democratic reforms and tightened autocratic control in 2004. Others have been able to manage conflict between deeply-divided social groups for substantial periods of time through the use of restrictions on political participation by a substantial out-group as in Malaysia (Chinese), Singapore (Malays), and South Africa (black-Africans under Apartheid). This also appears to be the strategy adopted recently in Fiji to limit political influence by ethnic-Indians (until that policy was challenged by a military coup in late 2006). Other anocracies are the result of failed transitions to greater democracy, as currently in Algeria, Angola, Cambodia, and Haiti.
In 1946, there were seventy-one independent states comprising the world's system of states (Figure 2 ; each of the following global trends figures contains a vertical line demarcating the end of the Cold War period in 1991). 8 Of these, twenty countries were ruled by democratic regimes and nineteen by autocratic regimes; thirty-two countries were subject to anocratic regimes. The high proportion of anocratic regimes was largely a consequence of the severe devastation and disruptions resulting from the Second World War. Another consequence of that war was a serious erosion of European control over its colonial territories in Asia and Africa. Many new states gained independence in the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s, doubling the number of states in the world by 1975. During this period of decolonization, there was a dramatic increase in the number of autocratic regimes: to a peak of eighty-nine autocracies in 1977. Although new states were about as likely to adopt democratic as autocratic forms of governance upon gaining independence, problems of manageability caused most new, democratic regimes to fail within several years and give way to autocratic rule. A dramatic shift away from rigidly autocratic regimes and toward more open governance began in 1990. This "rush toward democratization" was led by Latin American countries and the former-Socialist countries of Eastern Europe. During the Cold War period, there was a steady increase in the number of democracies at the rate of about one new democracy every two years. During the early 1990s, the number of democracies increased by about fifty percent (from 49 in 1989 to 76 in 1995). There was an even greater increase in the number of incomplete transitions to democracy, as the number of anocracies rose from twenty-seven to forty-eight (falling back to forty-three in late 2007). The number of autocracies continues to plummet: from a peak of eightynine in 1977 to just twenty-five at the end of 2007. There are ninety-four countries classified as democracies in late 2007. Countries that have transitioned to, or returned to, democratic governance since 2000 include Burundi, Comoros, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lebanon, Liberia, Nepal, Peru, Sri Lanka, and the newly independent states of East Timor and Mon-tenegro. The one thing that most clearly distinguishes the Globalization Era is that, for the first time in human history, the world has become a predominantly democratic one, at the global level.
While we view the major global shift toward greater democracy as a very important and generally positive trend, the sharp increase in the number of anocracies concurrent with the end of the Cold War is cause for concern. Historical research indicates that anocracies have been highly unstable regimes, with over fifty percent experiencing a major regime change within five years and over seventy percent within ten years. Anocracies have been much more vulnerable to new outbreaks of armed societal conflict; they have been about six times more likely than democracies and two and one-half times as likely as autocracies to experience new outbreaks of societal wars. Anocracies have also been about three times more likely to experience major reversions to autocracy than democracies. However, a "new truth" may be emerging regarding the vulnerability of anocratic regimes in the Globalization Era. In the past fifteen years, there have been far fewer failures of anocratic regimes than would be expected from the historical trends. Despite continued high numbers of anocratic regimes, there has been a steady decrease in global trends in violent conflict (see Figure 3 ) and fewer than expected outbreaks of new political instability events. We believe that this change in trends for anocratic regimes is due largely to notable increases in proactive international engagement, improved public expectations, and a lessening of political activism within militaries, which have been far less likely to intervene in politics or support forceful repression of public challenges to ruling elites. Recent research by the US Government's Political Instability Task Force has focused attention on the problem of "factionalism" in "incomplete democracies." 9 In general terms, the Polity conceptualization of factionalism refers to an advanced, macrosystemic stage of group polarization that transforms political behavior in distinctly contentious ways that are both systematic and sustained. Factionalism transforms the conventional politics of deliberation to the unconventional, anti-system politics of disruption and control. In the Task Force's models of the onset of political instability, the factionalism condition stands out as having the greatest explanatory power among global model indicators. 10 The condition of factionalism is a precursor to instability in about half of the countries where it occurs; the other principal outcome of factionalism is the further consolidation of democratic procedures and discourse. In accordance with its observed outcomes, the onset of political polarization or factionalism must be viewed as a political crisis condition, a direct challenge to the governing regime, and a key, policy decision-point between two fundamental courses: stabilization or destabilization.
The "problem of factionalism" in new or incomplete democracies is not a new finding, by any means. In fact, it is probably the most widely accepted, and least understood, problem in the process of democratization. In The Federalist No. 10, James Madison (1787) makes several prescient observations in this regard, among these are 1) the link between "domestic faction and insurrection;" 2) the opportunity afforded by factionalism for "adversaries to liberty" to declaim popular government; 3) the observation that the dynamics of "instability, injustice, and confusion" that factionalism introduces into public councils are the "mortal diseases under which popular governments have everywhere perished;" and 4) the conclusion that the "friend of popular governments" must act with due diligence to pursue any plan which "provides a proper cure" to factionalism "without violating the principles" of liberty and diversity. Nearly two-thirds of the anocracies charted in Figure 2 are characterized by factionalism currently. Examples of factionalism in early 2008 can be observed in Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Georgia, Guinea, Togo, Uganda, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. Factionalism can also be a serious problem in the more institutionalized democratic regimes, affecting about one-in-five in early 2008; current examples include Belgium, Bolivia, East Timor, Ecuador, Guyana, Lebanon, and Ukraine. While factionalism presents a very high risk factor for the onset of political instability, by far the greatest risk is for the onset of an "adverse regime change" or "autocratic backsliding" whereby democratization is reversed through the politicization and activism of the military and/or internal security forces and the oppositional faction(s) is/are forcibly repressed. We are currently conducting new research to gain a better understanding of the problem of factionalism in both the democratization process and in maintaining democratic governance.
can be made regarding global system performance in regard to the conflict dimension concerns the status of regional conflicts. The global trend in major armed conflict has continued its dramatic decline in the globalization era both in numbers of states affected by major armed conflicts and in general magnitude ( Figure 3 ). According to our calculations, the general magnitude of global warfare has decreased by over sixty percent since peaking in the mid-1980s, falling by the end of 2007 to its lowest level since 1960. 11 Civil warfare has been the prominent mode of warfare since the mid-1950s; increasing steeply and steadily through the Cold War period. This linear increase in civil warfare is largely explained by a general tendency toward longer, more protracted, wars during this period; internal wars often receiving crucial support from foreign suppliers. The rate of onset of new civil wars has remained fairly constant throughout the period with an average of about four new civil wars per annum. On the other hand, the general global level of interstate warfare has remained at a relatively low level since the end of the Second World War and the establishment of the United Nations Organization, which was specifically designed to help prevent interstate wars. Although there was a moderate increase in interstate wars during the last years of the Cold War, from 1977 to 1987, like civil warfare, interstate warfare has also declined substantially with the end of the Cold War. Of the interstate wars that took place during the Cold War period, many of the most serious were wars of independence fought during the decolonization phase that coincided with the first half of the Cold War. Of the conventional interstate wars, onsets occurred at the rate of about one event per annum, although onsets occurred at about double that rate during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Three-quarters of sixty-seven such wars remained at fairly low levels of violence. High magnitude interstate wars are limited to the several Israeli wars, the Vietnamese wars, the Afghanistan wars, the Iraqi wars, the India-Pakistan wars, and the recent war between Ethiopia and Eritrea; all except the Iraq-Iran war and the first Gulf War had some domestic, or former-domestic conflict aspect (i.e., internationalized civil wars). Over the entire period, since 1946, wars have been quite common: there have been over 320 distinct episodes of major armed conflict in the world's 162 countries. During the past twenty-five years (since 1983), just over one-half of all countries have experienced some major armed conflict (83 of 162 countries).
In early 2008, there were twenty-one countries embroiled in major armed conflicts; twenty of these countries are beset by civil or communal wars: Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, India, Iraq, Israel (Palestine), Kenya, Myanmar, Nigeria, Philippines, Pakistan, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand, Turkey, and Yemen. One of the current wars is touted as a "global war" (the United States' "global war on terrorism"), show evidence of serious cross-border effects that are increasing inter-state and regional tensions in the affected areas. Figure 4 , "Annual Numbers of New Onsets and Ongoing Wars," provides some additional evidence that, while the overall magnitude of global wars continues to diminish, the numbers of ongoing wars in the global system may be leveling off and the frequency of onset of new wars remains a serious problem. There is also some evidence of continuing and, even, increasing tensions in several of the countries where serious civil or communal warfare has been calmed through negotiated settlements or cease-fires. Wars in Turkey and Sri Lanka rekindled recently following long lulls in the fighting and outbursts of violence have returned to vex the complex social mosaic of Lebanon. Several countries have managed to push warring groups across their borders into neighboring countries where these groups continue to pose serious threats to both their home and host countries, as is the case with LRA fighters driven from Uganda and Hutu militias from Rwanda. Several others have managed to gain a respite from violence through de facto separation, as has occurred in Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Georgia, Moldova, and Ser-
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In regard to the US-led "global war on terrorism," two positive observations can be made: 1) direct attacks on the US and its (non-Muslim) allies have remained relatively rare since the dramatic September 11, 2001, attacks in the United States (notable exceptions were the 2004 attacks in Madrid and 2005 attacks in London) and 2) there have been few instances of attacks anywhere in which biological, chemical, or nuclear "weapons of mass destruction" have been used by non-state actors (with the exception of some attempts to use chlorine gas in Iraq). What we generally perceive as "terrorism," as distinct from the terrifying violence associated with warfare, is the direct and intentional targeting of civilian or other non-combatant groups. Civilian populations are inherently vulnerable to political violence and the general lawlessness and disruptions in livelihoods and essential services that are substance of attrition in protracted conflict situations; they live and stand in harm's way. 14 Explosive devices (concealed bombs, carbombs, and suicide bombers) are the principal means by which actors have directly attacked civilian populations with the intent to inflict high casualties. Figure 5 tracks the problem of "high casualty terrorist bombings" at the global level over the past eleven years; each of the "high casualty" events compiled for the trend graph resulted in at least fifteen people killed in a single attack in which bombs were a principal weapon used by the attacker(s). 15
What Figure 5 shows is a very steep increase in the number of people killed in high casualty terrorist bombings (HCTB) since the 9/11 attacks in the US. The number killed during the most recent year, 2007, was over 5,000; the average during the five-year period before prior to September 11, 2001, was about 380 per annum (up from about 160 per annum in the preceding five years). The graph also parcels attacks into three categories: Muslim countries, Muslim attacks in non-Muslim countries, and (non-Muslim) attacks in nonMuslim countries. HCTB incidents have been particularly prominent in the ongoing war in Iraq, increasing dramatically from the US invasion in March 2003 through September 2007. The total number of people killed in HCTB attacks over the seventeen-year study period stands at 21,848; however, the actual number of people killed in such attacks is probably substantially higher (c20-25%) as reported numbers of people killed are usually those killed immediately by the blast and often do not include numbers of people who subsequently die from their wounds. 16 By far, the largest HCTB event was the coordinated attacks using hijacked airliners as aerial bombs on September 11, 2001, in the US (2,982 killed). The next two largest HCTB events resulted in 520 killed in coordinated attacks on Qataniyah and Jazeera in Iraq on August 14, 2007, and 331 killed in the September 1, 2004, attack in Beslan, Russia. The recent trend in HCTB attacks stands in vivid contrast to the more encouraging, downward trend in major armed conflicts. While it may be too much to claim that HCTB terrorism has a global scope, it is certain that such terrorism has a global reach while it remains concentrated in the Middle East and South Asia. What has most characterized the increasing volume of HCTB attacks since 2001 has been their concentration in Muslim-on-Muslim violence (reaching ninety-five percent of all HCTB attacks in 2007), a phenomenon that may be best described as "Muslim rage." 17 Since September 2007, there has been a notable decrease in the incidence and numbers of people killed in HCTB events, declining by about fifty percent. Also notable is a dramatic shift in the location of HCTB events: there are substantial increases in the use of this tactic in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka and a dramatic decline in Iraq. On the other hand, there is a more general emphasis in the use of HCTB events on striking political targets (public officials and symbols of authority). Taken together, the shift in emphasis to political targets and the change in location for these events may be construed as signs of a "maturing," regional rebellion.
Global Development
The third major focus of this Global Report series is on global development and the general performance of the economic (material production) and social welfare aspects of globalization and the global system. The 2007 Global Report highlighted the great, regional (and, in some cases, intra-regional) disparities in economic development and the systemic distribution of income. It used a methodology termed "comparative regionalism" to assess the relative economic strength of the states comprising the global system of States. It claimed that the North Atlantic (US, Canada, and Western Europe) and South American regional sub-systems were "good-performance" systems, with a caveat pointing to the increased challenges posed by expansion of the European Union to include the countries of Eastern Europe and Turkey. The 2007 report went on to claim that the Central American and South and East Asian sub-systems were "middleperformance" and that the Non-Muslim Africa and Muslim Countries sub-systems were comparable "poor-performance" subsystems. It also highlighted the observation that the better-performing sub-systems were net-consumers of energy resources while the poorer-performing sub-systems were characterized by great income disparities between the resource-rich (often, netproducers of petroleum) countries and the resource-poor countries. The report raised serious concerns regarding the level of tensions that would likely occur in a global system characterized by relatively small, super-powerful, resource-demanding regions and large, weak, resource-producing regions. "It would seem that the potential for polarization and factionalism in such a system is quite high and, given the evidence that the 'income gap' is narrowing only slowly, will remain high for the foreseeable future. The policy implications of this examination can be summarized in a single word: caution." 18 The report concluded by presenting three challenges for the emerging era of globalization: "one is narrowing the divide between 'well being' and 'fragility' in constituent societies; a second is calming the voices of opposition and transforming their creativity and energy to promote rather than disrupt the global system; and a third is to recognize the full, disruptive potential of our growing dependence on petroleum and accept this as a global dilemma, requiring a global solution." 19 In this third section, we use measured changes in the State Fragility Index and Matrix from 1995 to 2007 to gain a better understanding of progress being made toward addressing the first challenge, that is, "narrowing the divide between 'well being' and 'fragility' in constituent societies." We will then conclude our 2008 Global Report by presenting our most recent State Fragility assessments for each of the 162 countries (with populations greater than 500,000) that constitute the global system in early 2008. The State Fragility Index and Matrix (Table 1 , following) rates each country according to its level of fragility in both effectiveness and legitimacy across four dimensions: security, governance, economic development, and social development.
Before we begin our general assessment of progress in global development we examine the relationship of state fragility and the standard measure of a country's economic performance: income measured as gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. Figure 6 plots the relationship between our most recent year State Fragility Index score and GDP per capita for each of the 162 countries included in this study. 20 We convert GDP per capita figures to their (base 10) logarithmic value because of the vast income disparities among countries in the global system, wherein the range of values is from $93 to $40,947 and the distribution is highly skewed such that fifty percent of country income values are less than $1,750 and seventy-five percent are less than $6,000. The "best fit" of the relationship between fragility (sfi2008 in Figure 6 ) and income (Log (base 10) of GDPPC) is shown to be slightly curvilinear (a quadratic function) with a fairly high correlation of 0.716. There is obviously a very strong, negative relationship between the income and fragility of states in the global system. However, we can also see a rather wide variance in fragility scores at any level of income. Countries plotted to the left of the curve at any level of income are performing better than expected by the model, whereas, countries plotted to the right of the curve are performing more poorly than expected given their level of income. In order to provide an additional perspective on the "oil curse" we examined in the 2007 report, we have identified all of the top, net oil-producing producing countries (i.e., those with annual net production per capita greater than ten barrels of oil; identified by shaded-diamond icons). Only Denmark, Russia, and Kazakhstan have fragility values near their expected values given their level of income; all other oilproducing states have fragility scores far greater than would be expected for their level of income. We have also identified two referent levels of income: the level of income where the model curve intersects the value 8 on the fragility index ($1,300) and the level of income at value 4 ($3,800).
Regional Changes in State Fragility: In order to gain a better understanding of change in the general performance of the global system, we use the State Fragility Index and Matrix assessment methodology to calculate scores for each country in earlier years and, then, examine the changes in assessment values across time. To this purpose, we calculated each country's fragility scores for each year beginning with the year 2000. In order to provide additional, temporal depth and a starting point for the emerging era of globalization, we then calculated each country's fragility scores for the year 1995. The year 1995 was chosen because it was well within the post-Cold War period (which we set as beginning in 1992) and had full data coverage on the relevant indicators used to construct the Fragility Index and Fifty-six of the 162 countries listed in Table 1 show consistent, positive change of three points or more over the period (i.e., a lower fragility index score for the year 2007, as compared with the 1995 score, with the year 2001 score either being the same or lower than the 1995 score) whereas, only ten countries show consistently negative change of two points or more over the same period (i.e., a higher fragility index). 21 In all, 110 of 160 countries show lower fragility scores in 2007 than in 1995, with 29 showing the same score and 21 showing higher fragility scores (two countries, East Timor and Montenegro did not exist in 1995). The largest improvements in fragility score across the study period are in Mali (nine point decrease); Guatemala (eight points); and Bangladesh, Bosnia, and Togo (seven points), with Croatia, India, Nicaragua, and Bhutan improving their scores by six points each. Countries with greater fragility scores across the period include Central African Republic (five point increase), Eritrea and Nepal (four points), and Congo-Brazzaville, Ecuador, Israel, Kyrgyzstan, Namibia, Solomon Islands, United States, Uzbekistan, and Venezuela (two point increases). . The largest change in fragility score is that of the United States, for which one-point increases in fragility scores are found in both Security Effectiveness (war in Iraq) and Security Legitimacy (increased use of state repression associated with the "global war on terrorism"). Overall, the North Atlantic region has long been and still remains the standard for gauging regional performance and (lack of) fragility. The question remains whether this region has set a reasonable and achievable standard that is accessible to all countries in the global system or whether some moderation in regional consumption, income, and wealth is a necessary corollary to broader system access to reasonable standards of achievement.
Closely following the North Atlantic region in terms of overall fragility is the Eastern European region comprising countries that have emerged from the FormerSocialist bloc, including many of the former-Soviet republics (except the predominantly Muslim countries of Albania, Bosnia, Azerbaijan, and the Central Asian republics). 24 This region's mean score in 2007 is 3.32, with scores ranging from 0 (Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovenia) to 9 (Moldova; Georgia follows with a score of 8 and Russia with 7). This region charts the greatest improvement in fragility scores since 1995 with an average decrease in State Fragility Index scores of 2.57 (cutting the regional mean by nearly half). The overall change in fragility scores for this region is due equally to improvements in effectiveness and legitimacy and these improvements are nearly equally spread across the four performance dimensions. Lesser improvements in fragility are notably in areas where this region had already made substantial achievements: security effectiveness and legitimacy and economic legitimacy. Improvements in the latter half of the period were somewhat less than the earlier half, probably due to the fact that the region was drawing closer to the "ceiling" of improvement. Of particular note is Croatia, which reduced its State Fragility Index score by six points, and Latvia and Georgia, which reduced their fragility scores by five points between 1995 and 2007.
Latin America countries improved their fragility scores by just over two points, on average, while the mean fragility score for the region stands at about double that of the Former-Socialist countries (6.52 in 2007). 25 Scores for Latin American countries range from 0 (Costa Rica) to 13 (Haiti; Ecuador follows with 12; Bolivia and Colombia score 11). Like the FormerSocialist countries, the Latin America region shows greater improvement in fragility scores during the earlier period, 1995-2001 with the pace of improvement dropping off substantially in the latter half of the period, 2001-2007. Latin American improvement was driven largely by gains in effectiveness, with the biggest gain over the entire period counted in Political Effectiveness ( 0.61). Improvements in Security, equally driven by gains in effectiveness and legitimacy, also accounted for a large part of the decrease in regional fragility scores ( 0.30 each; 0.60 total). In 2007, the legitimacy component of the fragility scores for the region (4.26 points) was nearly double that of the effectiveness component (2.26 points). The region performed particularly poorly in improving Political Legitimacy ( 0.13) and Economic fragility more generally ( 0.13 in Economic Effectiveness and 0.17 points in Economic Legitimacy). Guatemala led the region in improvement over this period, reducing its fragility score by eight points; Nicaragua improved by six points, Mexico by five points, and Cuba, El Salvador, Honduras, Panama, and Peru all reduced their fragility scores by four or more points over this period. Offsetting these improvements was a net increase in fragility for Ecuador and Venezuela (two points each).
As noted in our 2007 Global Report, the rate of growth of the regional income for the South and East Asia region, as a whole, nearly doubled the rate of economic growth in the world's richest countries; with much of the gains accounted for by the emergence of China as a major producer on the global market. 26 Fragility scores for this region show moderate improvement during the emerging era of globalization period, 1995-2007, with an average decrease in overall fragility of just over two points; the regional mean score stands at 7.68 in 2007. This region shows the broadest range of fragility scores, from 0 (Japan and South Korea) to 21 (Myanmar; East Timor and Nepal score next at 15 points). Improvements in this region were slow in the earlier half of the period and increased in the latter half; change is nearly equally spread across the two principal components: effectiveness ( 1.09) and legitimacy ( 0.96). Only modest gains are shown for Security, in general; Political Effectiveness; and Social Effectiveness; no net change is noted for Economic Legitimacy. Most of the region's improvements in fragility come in Political Legitimacy ( 0.50), Economic Effectiveness ( 0.45), and Social Legitimacy ( 0.32). Improvement was particularly strong in India and Bhutan (six points each), followed by Laos and Papua New Guinea (five points each) and Cambodia, South Korea, and Vietnam (four points each). During the same period, the fragility ratings for Nepal increased by four points with increased fragility on Security and Political Effectiveness and Countries comprising the Non-Muslim Africa region have the world's highest mean State Fragility Index score (14.48) and showed the least net improvement in fragility ratings across the period ( 1.43; discounting the "non-fragile" North Atlantic region). 28 Fragility scores for this region range from 4 (Botswana) to 20 (Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo). Despite the general stagnation in fragility ratings for this region, some African countries are noted as having reduced their fragility ratings substantially across the study period: Togo improved seven points; Angola and Equatorial Guinea improved by five points; and Liberia, Madagascar, and Uganda improved by four points each. The Africa region also had the most states that increased their fragility rating over this period: Central African Republic worsened by five points, Eritrea by four points, Congo (Brazzaville) and Namibia by two points, and Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, and Zimbabwe worsened by one point over this period. Particularly disheartening is the lack of improvement in the region's Social Effectiveness (measured by Human Development Index) and Social Legitimacy (measured by infant mortality rate) scores. Although we would expect to see the most improvement in these areas due to NGO and international donor efforts in these areas since 1995, we in fact see almost no net change in the earlier half of the period and only modest gains in the more recent half of the period. In terms of social legitimacy, we actually see worsening in many cases. Almost all the net decrease in fragility scores for the Non-Muslim Africa region is accounted for by improvements in Political Effectiveness ( 0.57) and Political Legitimacy ( 0.36).
Global Summary of Changes in State Fragility:
In keeping with the global system perspective of this report, we conclude our 2008 report with a global summary of
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Foreign Policy Bulletin changes in State Fragility during the period of study. These changes are presented in Figure 8 below. The chart is organized like the State Fragility Matrix (Table 1) in order to facilitate comparison; vertical bars are read on the left-hand scale and the blackdiamond icons are read on the right-hand scale. In all, the global total of "fragility points" assessed for the world's 162 countries (State Fragility Index; SFI) decreased by 292 points (17.8 percent) from the 1995 assessment. Breaking the Index into its two principal components, we see that the improvements were accounted for to a much greater degree by gains in Effectiveness (180 points; 22.4 percent decrease) than gains in Legitimacy (112 points; 13.4 percent decrease). This imbalance characterizes three of the four fragility dimensions.
Consistent with the dramatic decrease in global warfare presented in Figure 3 above, the Security Effectiveness category shows the lowest total fragility score of the eight fragility categories: 91 total points in 2007 (18.8 percent decrease from 1995). The other seven categories contribute similar point totals to the global total in 2007, ranging from 157 points in the Political Effectiveness category to 198 points in the Economic Legitimacy category. Security Legitimacy (state repression) shows very modest improvement since 1995 (17 points; 9.2 percent decrease). Political Effectiveness, reflecting the "third wave of democratization" and stabilization/consolidation of more open political systems in the Globalization Era, shows the most dramatic improvement (75 points; 32.3 percent decrease in fragility). The Political Legitimacy category shows strong improvement over the period (48 points; 21.8 percent decrease). The economic dimension shows only modest gains in Economic Effectiveness (37 points; 16.7 percent decrease) and no real change in Economic Legitimacy at the global system level, reflecting the general failure of primary commodity producers (rentier states) to reinvest foreign exchange earnings into greater manufacturing capacity. On the hand, steady progress can be noted in general improvements in Social Effectiveness (47 points and a 19.8 percent decrease in fragility) and Social Legitimacy (45 points; 19.6 percent decrease).
Concluding Remarks
The end of the Cold War ushered in an era of globalization that is, for the first time, governed predominantly by democratic regimes; this marks a watershed moment in modern human history and the beginning of a new world order. However, this new world order encompasses a global system that, while improving steadily according to our analysis, lacks the capacity and resiliency that would provide a solid foundation for a stable and durable societal-system. The Global Report 2007 charted a global distribution of income among its constituent states characterized by highly unequal regional development and profiled a "system that is profoundly split into 'Haves' (about 15% of the global population) and 'Have-nots.' [A system in which] the potential for polarization and factionalism…is quite high and…will remain high for the foreseeable future." 29 The current Global Report on development underscores Africa's continuing malaise and highlights a general imbalance between gains in effectiveness and continuing deficits in legitimacy. This imbalance is especially problematic when considered in the context of our growing investment in democracy. While governance at the state level has become predominantly democratic, the nature and quality of governance at the global system level is challenged by its large number of anocratic states struggling to maintain political stability and a small number of classic autocracies controlling some of its most vital and coveted oil reserves. Governance at the global level, whether formal or informal, is bound to reflect the nature and quality of the contrasts inherent in the system. While violent conflict in the global system continues to diminish in total magnitude, some protracted societal wars continue to contradict the general trend and defy proactive engagement, new wars break out regularly, and extremist violence and radical tactics draw crucial resources away from critical systemic development. We believe that our observations have compiled an encouraging report on global system performance in the emerging era of globalization. However, we caution that this progress has largely been purchased with a "peace dividend" that may now be largely spent. Further progress and consolidation of the new world order will surely demand a determined and active commitment among states and citizens to reason and moderation in managing the challenges that define our common predicament.
The State Fragility Index and Matrix 2008
Having examined the general performance of the Global System of States in the areas of security, governance, and development and discussed changes in the fragility of states since 1995, we conclude this Global Report 2008 with our assessments of the fragility of the system's constituent units: the 162 independent (macro) states. The idea of a using a matrix of effectiveness All of these schemes recognize that assessing a state's ability to win the loyalty of its people depend on its performance in multiple spheres, spanning governance, economic performance and opportunity, security, and delivery of social services. What the IRIS research team added was to make explicit the need for governing regimes to exhibit both effectiveness and legitimacy in its performance of those tasks. That is, to achieve maximum stability a regime must both carry out the tasks expected of a competent government, and maintain legitimacy by being perceived as just and fair in the manner it carries out those tasks. A state may remain in a condition of fragile instability if it lacks effectiveness or legitimacy in a number of dimensions; however a state is likely to fail, or to already be a failed state, if it has lost both. The collaboration between the Center for Global Policy at George Mason University and the Center for Systemic Peace makes the State Fragility assessments unique in that they are based on realtime monitoring of security and political conditions in each of the 162 countries under examination and they use wellrespected and annually updated sources for the Economic and Social assessments. These primary information resources make the State Fragility Index as current and consistent as possible. Table 1 
Global Report 2008
Foreign Policy Bulletin (Coups, 1993 (Coups, -2007 , but not including coup events associated with Polity adverse regime changes (these major regime changes cause the "durability" score to be reset to "0" and, so, would be double-counted, see above). These indicators are scored such that: Durability < 10 years = 1; Leader Years in Office > 12 years = 1; and Total Coup Events: 1-2 = 1 and >2 = 2. These indicators are then added to produce the Regime/Governance Stability score (scores of 4 are recoded as 3). Note: Countries coded in the Polity IV dataset as an "interregnum" (i.e., total or near total collapse of central authority, 77) for the current year are scored 3 on the Political Effectiveness indicator. Political Instability Task Force (PITF; formerly known as the State Failure Task Force) was created in 1994 at the request of senior policy makers in the US Government; it is tasked with developing data-driven, global and regional models to help explain, and anticipate, the emergence of serious political instability situations in the world's independent states. 10. The Political Instability Task Force (PITF) findings are reported regularly; the problem of factionalism was first identified in the most recent (Phase V) findings. Task 
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